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The structure and philosophy of Trinidad’s  
local government 
With just under forty-four (44) per cent of the electorate 
participating in the 1996 local government poll1, questions have been 
raised regarding the structure, functions and importance of local 
government to the citizenry at large. To be sure, it has been suggested 
that with the turnout at the local government poll being substantially 
lower than the turnout at Parliamentary elections2, the lower voter 
participation is reflective of the apathy which the vast majority of the 
citizenry has for local government. Of course such apathy could be 
interpreted as a direct result of the fact that many people remain 
 
                                                          
1. The exact turnout at the polls was 43,82 % of the electorate. See Trinidad and 
Tobago, Elections and Boundaries Commission, « Report of the Elections and 
Boundaries Commission on the Local Government Elections Held on Monday, June 
24, 1996 », Port of Spain, 1996. 
2. In the Parliamentary elections of 1986, 1991 and 1995, the percentage of votes 
cast against the electorate was 65,45 %, 65,76 % and 63,30 % respectively. See 
Trinidad and Tobago, Elections and Boundaries Commission, « Report of the Elections 
and Boundaries Commission on the Parliamentary Elections Held on Monday 
November 6, 1995 », Port of Spain, 1996, Appendix 8, p. 270. 
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uninformed about the structure and functions of local government 
authorities3. Such lack of knowledge or even the general apathy 
towards local government could be explained by the history, and more 
particularly the more recent history, of local government in Trinidad. 
Although the notion of local government had its origins, in 
Trinidad, from as early as the 16th century, when the island was under 
Spanish colonial rule, the modern concept of local government is a far 
cry from what existed under colonial rule. Contemporary local 
government authorities, in Trinidad, have very limited powers and 
functions when compared with the powers which the Cabildo exercised 
under Spanish colonial rule, and even under the Town councils system 
as was instituted under British colonialism4. To be sure, the present 
system of local government only affords four (4) of the fourteen (14) 
local government authorities the power to raise revenues. Put 
differently, ten (10) local government authorities do not have the 
power to collect rates and taxes5. Moreover, in the cases of the four 
municipal authorities which are allowed, in law, to raise revenues from 
land and building taxes, as well as other charges, the revenues raised 
accounts for between 5 percent and 20 percent of expenditure6. 
 
                                                          
3. For empirical data on the ordinary citizens appreciation of local government in 
Trinidad, see Bishnu Ragoonath, Decentralization. Local Government and Develop-
ment : Trinidad, 1952-1990, (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis), The University of the West 
Indies, 1991. 
4. For an extended discussion on the role and functions of local government 
authorities under Spanish and British colonial administrations, see B. Ragoonath, 
« Shifting Nature of Decentralization : A Review of the Evolution of Local 
Government in Trinidad and Tobago », in Indian Journal of Public Adrninistration, 
Vol. 39, n° 4, 1993. 
5. It may be noted that the legislation governing Local Government in Trinidad, 
namely the Municipal Corporations Act – Act 21 of 1990, makes provision for all 
corporations to raise revenues and collect taxes. However, specific sections of the Act 
were not Assented to, by the President, and thus created the division whereby the older 
Cities, town and Borough councils were allowed to collect such taxes, but not the 
Regional Corporations. It may also be noted that the UNC-NAR government caused 
those sections of the Act which were not previously Assented, to get the Assent from 
the President, a mere week before the 1996 poll. 
6. See B. Ragoonath, « Trends in Commonwealth Caribbean Local Government – 
Part II : The Trinidad Case », in Local Government World, n° 6, December 1995,  
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Effectively, therefore, local governments, in Trinidad, remain 
dependent upon central government for the majority of their funding. 
Such funding, it may be instructive to note, is normally inadequate 
resulting in inefficiencies and ineffective delivery of services provided 
by local governments. 
The controls exercised by the central government with respect to 
finance inevitably impacts upon the functions and operations of the 
local government authorities. Local authorities, in Trinidad, are 
required to maintain roadways, drainage, markets, parks and recreation 
grounds, cemeteries and public buildings. However, they are not 
involved in the provision of public utilities such as water, electricity, 
and fire prevention nor do they play any integral role in transportation, 
ports control or management, and education. Moreover, central 
government’s permission is required, through the minister’s consent, 
before any local authority embarks upon the erection or acquisition of 
buildings to establish libraries, or to care for infants and/or indigent 
persons or even « generally for the improvement of the Municipality 
and for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof »7. In such a situation, 
Trinidad’s local governments are largely impotent with limited powers 
and autonomy. Consequently, in the run up to the 1996 elections, the 
issue of power and authority of local government was to become a 
major campaign issue, with all the political parties advocating greater 
devolution and empowerment. This paper will elaborate on this and 
other campaign issues later. However, as stated above, based on it 
limited financial base, as well as the limited role local authorities were 
allowed to play in the development of their communities, local 
government has been and continues to be viewed as of little 
importance in the society. 
The limitations with respect to functions and finances were not 
the only reasons for local government to be viewed in a negative 
context, for the central government in Trinidad has also played a direct 
                                                          
 
pp. 10-11. See also Ragoonath, Decentralization. Local Government and Develop-
ment : Trinidad. 1952-1990. 
7. Trinidad and Tobago, Parliament, « Municipal Corporations Act (n° 21 of 
1990) », Port of Spain, 1990, Section 112 (2) d. 
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role in emasculating local government. To be sure, local government 
authorities operated as mere agents of central government in 
administering various functions, but without any real authority in 
developing community participation and development8. Such 
deficiencies were further compounded in the post 1973 period, when, 
with the country having benefitted from an oil boom, the central 
government usurped various functions which local governments were 
legally authorized to perform. Central government by-passed local 
government councils and directly involved itself in providing 
recreation and market facilities. Furthermore, state owned companies 
were established for the repair of roads and to provide sanitation 
services, thereby duplicating the service providers, and which, by 
extension, emphasized the helplessness of the local authorities which 
were starved for funds9. The effect of all of this was the further loss of 
confidence of the electorate towards local government, the result of 
which was low voter turnout at the polls. 
But whereas it could and has been suggested that voter 
participation at the polls in the 1996 local government elections was 
low, it may be noted that when compared with other local government 
elections, the 1996 turnout has been the highest ever recorded. Prior to 
1996, the turnout at local government elections never exceeded 40 
percent of the electorate, the previous highest turnout was in 1987, 
when 39,9 percent of voters participated10. This higher than normal 
local government turnout in 1996 can partially be explained on the 
basis of national politics in Trinidad. In this regard, it may be noted 
that national politics in Trinidad is dominated by party politics as well 
as race and ethnicity-based politics. 
 
                                                          
8. For a discussion of the emasculation of local government from a community 
development perspective, see S. Craig, Community Development in Trinidad and 
Tobago : From Welfare to Patronage, Jamaica, ISER, 1974. 
9. See Bishnu Ragoonath, « Decentralization and Structural Adjustment : An 
Analysis of the Impact of Structural Adjustment to the Decentralization Process in 
Trinidad and Tobago », in J. La Guerre ed., Structural Adjustment : Public Policy and 
Administration in the Caribbean, Trinidad, School of Continuing Studies, UWI, 1994. 
10. See Trinidad and Tobago, Elections and Boundaries Commission, « Report of 
the elections and Boundaries Commission on the Local Government Elections Held on 
Monday 28 September, 1992 », Port of Spain, 1992, Appendix VII(b). 
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PARTY POLITICS IN A PLURAL SOCIETY 
Trinidad is sometimes described as an « institutionally plural 
society »11 bordering on being an ethnically bipolar society12. Bipolar 
societies are those wherein there are two major ethnic blocs, 
approximately equal in size and which together constitute eighty 
percent or more of the population13. Trinidad falls short of being 
bipolar since the total of both blocs is just 79,86 percent of the national 
population. Notwithstanding this shortcoming in bipolar analysis, it 
may be noted that the Afro-Trinidadian bloc (39,6 percent) and the 
Indo-Trinidadian bloc (40,26 percent)14, are of near equal strength in 
terms of numbers. The fact that both groups have tended to compete 
for political power over the years, and which culminated in a tie at the 
1995 Parliamentary elections and with a very close result in the 1996 
local government poll, emphasizes the bipolarity of the society. Such 
results however are better explained through the plural society theory. 
The plural society thesis takes its point of departure from the 
perspective of two groups living side by side, and only meet in the 
marketplace15. Based on the history of both major groups, in Trinidad, 
this is generally what obtains. The Afro-Trinidadian group are the 
descendants of African slaves who were brought to Trinidad, under 
British colonialism, to work on the sugar estates. With the end of 
slavery, the Africans left the plantations, thereby creating a demand for 
new labor. East Indians were then brought as indentured laborers to fill 
the labor void, on the sugar estates. Based on such a history, Indo-
Trinidadians have tended to remain closer to the areas where sugar 
cane is still being cultivated, or was cultivated in the time of 
 
                                                          
11. See M. G. Smith, « Pluralism and Social Stratification », in Ryan S. ed., Social 
and Occupational Stratification in Contemporary Trinidad and Tobago, Trinidad, 
Institute of Social and Economic Research, UWI, 1991. 
12. See R. S. Milne, Politics in Ethnically Bipolar states, Vancouver, UBC, 1981. 
13. See Milne, Politics in Ethnically Bipolar States, p. 1. 
14. See Population data from the 1990 Census, as is found in Trinidad and Tobago, 
Central Statistical Office, « Annual Statistical Digest 1992 », Port of Spain, 1995. 
15. For a general discussion of the tenets of the plural society as it relates to 
Trinidad, see Smith, Pluralism and Social Stratification. Also see M. G. Smith, 
Culture. Race and Class in the Commonwealth Caribbean, Jamaica, UWI, 1984. 
204 Bishnu RAGOONATH 
 
 
 
 
PDLC n° 11, 1999 
indentureship16. Based on their location and settlement, Indo-
Trinidadians continue to dominate the agricultural sector or have 
moved into private businesses, again predominantly located on the 
plains in central and south Trinidad, in close proximity to the former 
sugar cane estate areas. Afro-Trinidadians, on the other hand, are today 
predominately found living in the urban areas in the north of the island, 
as well as close to the petroleum industrial sites in the south. Based on 
their locale, Afro-Trinidadians dominate public sector jobs17 as well as 
having a heavy presence in the industrial sector and more particularly 
the petroleum industry. Effectively, this racial separation in terms of 
demography and occupation facilitates the adoption of a plural society 
thesis for Trinidad, but more importantly, it promotes political 
separatism, which would impact on the democratic process and 
elections. Before implications on the politics are developed, it may be 
instructive to note one other aspect of the plural society thesis which 
has implications for political behavior in Trinidad, and this relates to 
culture and religion. 
Apart from demography and occupation, cultural behavior and 
traditions, as well as religious practices, also accentuate differences 
and separation between the races in Trinidad. With regard to the Afro-
Trinidadian community, when the African slaves were brought over, 
they were denied the opportunity to retain and practice aspects of 
African culture and was thus forced to assimilate Western culture and 
Christianity. The result of this is that the majority of Afro-Trinidadians 
today engage in Western cultural behavior and traditions as well as 
practice Christianity. The lndo-Trinidadian community, on the other 
hand, have been able to retain cultural traditions as well religious 
 
                                                          
16. See Colin Clarke, « Spatial pattern and Social Interaction among Creoles and 
Indians in Trinidad and Tobago », in Yelvington K. ed., Trinidad Ethnicity, Tennessee, 
The University of Tennessee Press, 1993. 
17. Statistics show that Indo-Trinidadians account for 34 % of Public service jobs, 
24 % of police Service positions and 10 % of the military. See L. L. Dattoo, « Ethnic 
Conflict Resolution in Trinidad and Tobago : The Role of Proportionality in 
Representative Bureaucracy », Journal of Ethno-Development, Vol. 3, n° 3, 1994. See 
also S. Ryan and J. La Guerre, Employment Practices in the Public and Private Sectors 
in Trinidad and Tobago, St. Augustine, Centre for Ethnic Studies, 1993. 
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beliefs as were practiced by their indentured East Indians forefathers. 
Consequently, a substantial section of the Indo-Trinidadian community 
presently engage in Indian cultural traditions with regard to food, 
music, dance and even dress. With regard to religion about 60 percent 
of Indo-Trinidadians are Hindu, while just over 10 percent are 
Muslim18. The notion of religion and culture is critical to Trinidad’s 
politics, especially since it was only in 1995 that a non-Christian 
government took office. Before exploring the politics which led to 
such a political outcome, it must be emphasized that all separation 
between the two major races, as indicated above, are generalized. Put 
differently, there is no exclusivity of any one race in any area of 
activity or even settlement. Thus, it is near impossible to find a 
community in Trinidad inhabited solely by persons of one race. 
Similarly, there is no occupational form which is exclusive to one 
group, devoid of persons of another race. 
Based on the demography, occupation, cultural behavior and 
religion, politics in Trinidad have incurred some separation. Indo-
Trinidadians have traditionally supported the political party connected 
with the sugar workers union and which was led by an Indo-
Trinidadian. It may be noted that since 1956, when « party politics » 
took firm root, with racial connotations19, the « Indian Party » has 
undergone various metamorphosis and name changes, culminating in 
what is presently known as the United National Congress (UNC)20. 
The Afro-Trinidadian party has been much more stable and has been 
able to maintain a single party structure, in the form of the People’s 
National Movement (PNM), since 1956. This party is led by an Afro-
Trinidadian, and has traditionally had the support of the Waterfront 
workers union, as well as public sector and other urban-based trade 
unions. But, while such distinctions can be made with reference to the 
 
                                                          
18. See Trinidad and Tobago, Central Statistical Office, « Annual Statistical 
Digest ». 
19. See S. Ryan, Race and Nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago, Toronto, 
University of Toronto Press, 1972. 
20. For a discussion on the evolution of the various « Indian Parties » see B. 
Ragoonath, « Race and Class in Caribbean Politics », in Plural Societies, Vol. 18, n° 1, 
1988. 
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generalized political behavior of the two major racial blocs, it must be 
emphasized that such descriptions are generalizations, and it is not 
unusual to find Indo-Trinidadians supporting the PNM and Afro-
Trinidadians supporting the UNC. Effectively, there is no mutual 
exclusivity in terms of political participation and behavior. 
Notwithstanding this, the fact remains that supporters of either party 
are predominantly of the same race as that of the leader of the party. 
The fact that two parties, representing the two major racial 
blocs, presently dominate the political scene in Trinidad, should not be 
used to suggest that there are no other parties. To be sure, various other 
parties have developed over the years and some are still existent until 
today. These parties tend to try to bridge the racial gap, thereby 
seeking to present a multiracial party. All but one such party failed to 
achieve any success at elections. In the one instance that there was 
success, such success came with United Labour Front, the « Indian 
Party » at that time, submerging itself with other parties, in 1986, tp 
form the National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR) which contested 
and won the election. However, shortly after its ascension into office, 
the party split apart with various elements going back to their original 
form21. When the « Indian Party » withdrew and reformatted itself 
under the banner of the UNC, it was made clear that the NAR’s 
success depended upon the « Indian vote » and without which, it could 
no longer muster enough support to have any real success in elections. 
The party failed to win a seat, in Trinidad, in the Parliamentary 
elections of 1991 and 1995, as well as in the local government 
elections of 1992 and 1996. Notwithstanding this inability to win in a 
first past the post system, the party has continuously been able to win 
substantial levels of support. From this perspective, it is clear that there 
is a segment of the population in favor of accommodation politics, 
beyond race-based party politics as currently exists. 
 
                                                          
21. For an elaborate discussion on the formation and dissolution of the NAR, see 
S. Ryan, The Disillusioned Electorate, Port of Spain, Imprint, 1989. 
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POLITICAL COMPETITION AND ELECTORAL 
STALEMATES  
In a system based on party politics and more so race-based party 
politics, it was inevitable that once the two major racial blocs 
equalized, political competition would become crucial in determining 
which group would seize political power. Moreover, acknowledging 
the spatial demography, it was clear that political stalemates would 
arise. This is exactly what occurred in the 1995 Parliamentary elections 
and was more or less repeated in the 1996 local government elections. 
At the end of september 1995, the term of office of all local 
government councils expired. The legislation governing Local 
Government polls in Trinidad provided that elections be held within 
three months from the date of the expiration of the previous councils, 
thus the country awaited the Prime Minister announcement of the date 
for the local government poll. However, on 6 october 1995, when the 
Prime Minister did go to the Parliament to announce an election date, 
he surprised the nation by posting 6 november 1996 as the date for 
Parliamentary elections, rather than the date for the local government 
poll. Effectively, the Prime Minister dissolved Parliament. It may be 
instructive to note that the Parliamentary term was due to expire some 
fourteen months later. 
 
With the country and the political parties having been given a 
mere one month to campaign for a parliamentary election, and moreso 
one for which they were not prepared nor expected, the politicking was 
two-pronged, based on personalities as well as issues. From the 
perspective of the ruling PNM, the party and its leadership boasted that 
it had caused a turn around in the economy and that the country was on 
the road back to economic growth and success. In this scenario, the 
PNM’s campaign slogans included that of bringing the country back to 
being « World Class »22 and boasted of « Leadership that’s 
 
                                                          
22. PNM leader and Prime Minister Patrick Manning told a PNM elections 
convention that his party was « the only vehicle for making Trinidad and Tobago a 
world class society ». See « Speech Delivered by Political Leader of the PNM, Prime 
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Working »23. But in promoting its own leadership, the party launched a 
vicious personality campaign against the opposition leader, Basdeo 
Panday, and his colleague, Ramesh Lawrence Maharaj. The attack on 
Panday was based on sexual harassment charges which were before the 
courts, and which were later thrown out as being without substance. 
With respect to the attacks on Maharaj, the PNM’s leader, Patrick 
Manning, feared Maharaj, a prominent and successful criminal and 
human rights attorney, becoming Attorney General. Manning, in his 
quest to undermine Maharaj’s credibility, reminded the population that 
Maharaj’s name was mentioned in the Scott Drug Report, 
notwithstanding that the report did not demonstrate any wrongdoing, 
far less to have proven such on Maharaj’s part. While there was initial 
support for Manning, especially in relation to his fear of Maharaj 
becoming Attorney General24, the counter claims by Maharaj and the 
UNC, in relation to dealing with crime and corruption, led to a 
swelling of the ranks of the UNC. 
Since the UNC was in opposition and did not have a record on 
which it could boast, it took the challenge of taking the campaign to 
the PNM. The UNC’s campaign seems to have led the debate, with the 
PNM grasping to react to the UNC’s pronouncements. The UNC’s 
campaign focussed on the many issues which were affecting the 
society, such as crime, poverty, employment and education. The 
centrepiece of the UNC’s campaign was the urgent need for crime 
prevention and suppression25. This was of particular interest to the 
middle and upper classes, many of whom believed they were targets of 
criminal activity, and, moreover, with the police being largely 
immobile, citizens felt they could no longer rely on the police for help. 
The UNC thus called upon the citizens to « give yourself a chance for 
                                                          
 
Minister Patrick Manning at the Chaguaramas Convention Centre », Newsday 
(Trinidad), 10 october 1995, p. 18. 
23. See People’s National Movement, « People’s National Movement Elections 
1995 Manifesto », Port of Spain, 1995. 
24. See B. C. Pires, « Ah iraid Ramesh », Daily Express (Trinidad), 3 november 
1995, p. 8. 
25. See The United National Congress, « UNC Manifesto/95 : Plan for Change », 
Couva, 1995. 
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better jobs, a safer community, improved schools and a  brighter 
future »26. Apart from dealing with the issues, the UNC had the 
advantage of one other card which both the PNM, as well as history 
had played into the UNC’s hand  ; this was the card of race-based, and, 
more specifically, Indo-Trinidadian politics. From the historical 
perspective, 1995 marked the 150th anniversary of the arrival of the 
first Indo-Trinidadians to the island of Trinidad. Accordingly, 
throughout the year, although climaxing on 30 may 1995, the 
anniversary date of the arrival of the first shipload of Indians, various 
activities were staged, all of which sought to engender amongst the 
Indian community a spirit of arrival and belonging. Such belonging 
was critical, for prior to 1995, while some Indo-Trinidadians were able 
to attain some economic power, the community as a whole was never 
able to wield any real social or political power. In the plural society 
context, where Afro-Trinidadians dominated the political and social 
spheres, Indo-Trinidadians had been relegated to being a minority, 
with the psychological underpinnings of being a minority, subordinate 
group of second-class citizens27. The commemoration of the 150th 
anniversary sought to change that, and when given a chance later in the 
year to make a statement of Indo-Trinidadian solidarity, oneness and 
power, the community voted for the UNC, the Indo-Trinidadian party, 
to ensure that for the first time in the country’s history, an Indo-
Trinidadian government and Prime Minister would hold office.  
It may be instructive to note that for PNM leader, Patrick 
Manning, a major issue in the election was that there was « a strong 
desire among certain sections of the community to have and Indian 
Prime Minister » and hence the « emotive appeals » on this basis 
ensured a victory for Basdeo Panday28. 
 
                                                          
26. United National Congress, « UNC Manifesto/95 », Couva, 1995, back cover. 
27. See S. Ryan, « Beware the Drums of Indian Arrival », in Sunday Express, 
January 8, 1995, p. 9. Also see B. Tewarie, « Hinduism, Nation-Building and the 
State », in S. Ryan ed., The Independence Experience 1962-1987, St. Augustine, The 
Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1988. 
28. See V. Baksh, « I have no regrets’ Manning Toasts the Best Government T&T 
has ever had », in Sunday Guardian (Trinidad), 3 december 1995, p. 5. 
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Alongside the historical perspective, Indo-Trinidadian solidarity 
around the UNC was bolstered by what may be termed an anti-Indo-
Trinidadian outlook of the PNM. Such an outlook started emerging 
early in 1995, when the PNM leader and Prime Minister, Patrick 
Manning, fired his Indo-Trinidadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ralph 
Maraj. The firing of Maraj followed a period during which Maraj 
openly queried styles of leadership as within the country. While Maraj 
never indicted the Prime Minister’s leadership, it was clear that he was 
having problems with his political leader. Accordingly, and with a very 
frivolous explanation, the Prime Minister, in a televised broadcast, 
publicly fired Maraj. Within months of the firing of Maraj, Manning 
and the PNM found themselves at odds with Maraj’s sister, Occah 
Seapaul, who was also the Speaker of the House of Representatives. 
With their razor-thin majority, the PNM could not afford the Speaker 
to rule against the government. Moreover, when disparaging remarks 
towards the Speaker were made by senior government Ministers in the 
House, the Speaker suspended a Minister, and several others were said 
to be under review. At that moment the Manning administration placed 
the Speaker under House arrest. These actions by Manning and the 
PNM were immediately placed in a racial context. With the PNM 
already being stereotyped as an Afro-Trinidadian party, the Maraj 
dismissal and Seapaul’s arrest further suggested that the party was 
seemingly purging itself of Indo-Trinidadians. The PNM’s actions 
against Maraj and Seapaul led to Maraj joining the UNC and 
contesting the elections on behalf of the Indo-Trinidadian Party. 
Moreover, on mounting the UNC platform, Maraj is reported as having 
said he had finally come home within the UNC and this was where he 
belonged29, thereby confirming the racial suspicions borne by many 
Indo-Trinidadians that the PNM was hostile to the Indo-Trinidadian 
community. The racial divide thus served to galvanize the Indo-
Trinidadian community to vote against the PNM in 1995. 
 
                                                          
29. See « Ralph Maraj presents first UNC candidate », in Trinidad Guardian 
(Trinidad), 7 october 1995, p. 1. 
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In such a scenario the Parliamentary elections of 1995 were 
contested on 6 November 1996. Consequently, based on the race-based 
demographic map, the UNC was able to win all but one seat where 
Indo-Trinidadians accounted for over 35 percent of the populace30. In 
terms of numbers, this meant that the UNC was able to capture 17 of 
the 34 seats available in Trinidad. With the other 17 seats going to the 
PNM, an electoral tie arose, thereupon leaving the country in a state of 
indecision, with no one party able to form a government on its own. 
Fortunately however, there was Tobago31, the smaller island in the 
unitary state of Trinidad and Tobago. In terms of the composition of 
the House of Representative, Tobago had two seats, which in the 1995 
election were won by the candidates of the National Alliance for 
Reconstruction (NAR). The two elected NAR representatives were not 
obtuse to the notion of entering into a coalition and this they did with 
the UNC, thus making it possible for the President to offer the Prime 
Ministerial position to the UNC leader, Basdeo Panday. A UNC-NAR 
coalition government was thus installed. The fact that a government 
was formed meant that the electoral stalemate emanating out of the 
1995 Parliamentary election was thus settled. Such a resolution was 
but a stop-gap measure, since, it became clear that once Trinidadians 
voted along racial lines, electoral ties, in Trinidad, were almost 
inevitable. To be sure, it was to recur in the local government election 
which was held eight months later. 
 
                                                          
30. For a breakdown of the racial composition of constituencies in Trinidad, see 
Selwyn Ryan, « Communalism vs. Cosmopolitanism : Indian Responses to National 
Politics in Trinidad and Tobago », paper presented to conference on challenges and 
change : « The Indian Diaspora in its Historical anal Contemporary contexts », The 
University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad, 1995. 
31. Tobago is one of the two islands in the twin-island state of Trinidad and 
Tobago. In terms of size, it constitutes less than one tenth of land area of the country as 
a whole and less than 5 % of the population. In terms of local administration, Tobago 
operates under a Tobago House of Assembly, a different system from Trinidad, and 
with separate elections, and thus the 1996 local government election, in Trinidad, did 
not have any direct impact or relevance to Tobago. It is in this context that Tobago has 
not been given any indepth consideration in this paper. 
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SETTING THE STAGE FOR A 1996 LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
POLL 
Notwithstanding that the Parliamentary elections were contested on  
6 november 1995, there was still the legal requirement for new 
government to call the local government elections within three months 
of 27 september 1995, the date on which all the councils retired, or to 
seek Parliamentary approval to defer the election. With the new 
government needing time to settle itself into government, as well as to 
attend to other « more pressing » constitutional matters, such as the 
Opening of Parliament and the delivery of the 1996 budget, it was 
inevitable that the government would seek Parliamentary approval to 
defer the election. Thus, early in december, a Bill was taken to the 
Parliament to restore the former local government councils for a 
maximum period of nine months, from 27 september 1995. While the 
Bill sought to extend the deadline for the holding of the elections until 
june 1996, the Minister did assure Parliament that the elections would 
be held « as soon as practically possible »32. The extension was 
obtained though the former councils were not resuscitated, but rather 
were replaced by Advisory Committees33. 
Although the Minister of Local Government had promised that 
the local government elections would be held « as soon as practically 
possible », the UNC-NAR government was in no rush to call the 
elections. Once the six-month extension was granted, the government 
diverted its attention to consolidating itself in office, while attempting 
to treat with various crises which either arose or were created by the 
largely inexperienced administration. In this regard, the government’s 
first task was getting the 1996 budget passed before the end of January, 
as was constitutionally required. In so doing, the UNC-NAR revisited 
various plans of the former administration, and took the decision to 
discontinue various construction/developmental projects which were 
 
                                                          
32. See « Local Government Election on the Horizon », in Trinidad Guardian, 
December 9, 1995, p. 6. 
33. See Trinidad and Tobago Parliament, « Act 36 of 1995 » ; also see K. Maharaj 
& S. Sheppard, « Local Government Bodies Denied Extra Time », in Daily Express 
(Trinidad), December 16, 1995, p. 7.  
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centralized in Port of Spain and environs. The Port of Spain Urban 
Renewal and Beautification programme as well as the National Library 
Complex, were deprioritised within the new government’s budget. 
Such policy decisions were immediately politicized, both on the basis 
of race and political demography. From the political space perspective, 
having had the locus of power shifting « from Port to Plantation », 
there was the fear that the resources of the state would see similar 
shifts, resulting in the lack of any development to areas such as Port of 
Spain, and the urban east-west corridor, which in the main, supported 
and returned PNM representatives. Given the spatial distribution of 
race, such a scenario would mean that the Afro-Trinidadian community 
would be deprived of all the jobs which were to emanate from these 
projects. Furthermore, by inference, since development projects would 
be opened in central and south Trinidad, Indo-Trinidadians, who 
populate such areas, would have the advantage of finding employment 
there. 
The employment concerns of Afro-Trinidadians were not just 
limited to construction workers. In the category of professionals, and 
even public sector workers, there were serious concerns as to whether 
Afro-Trinidadians were to be made to suffer as a form of direct 
retribution for the failure of that community to support the UNC. Such 
concerns erupted with the early termination of the contracts of several 
Afro-Trinidadians who were hired by previous governments to serve as 
Chief Executive Officers in various state enterprises A near similar 
situation arose at the Ministry of Education where the Minister 
reportedly sent his two Atro-Trinidadian Permanent Secretaries on 
vacation. Since ministers do not have any direct authority or control 
over public servants34, the position taken by Minister Nanan was 
quickly interpreted as having political and racial connotations. 
Consequently, the leader of the Opposition, in his contribution to the 
budget debate, and although not explicitly posing the question in terms 
of race, raised the question of public sector layoffs35. Consequently, in 
 
                                                          
34. See F. Joseph, « Lalla : Nanan wrong “Minister can send no officer on 
leave” », in Trinidad Guardian, January 3, 1996, p. 1. 
35. See « Manning raises prospect of public sector layoffs », in Trinidad Guardian, 
January 17, 1996, p. l4.  
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such a situation, the government, in recognizing possible civil 
problems, focussed its attention on dealing with some of the concerns 
of the Urban Afro-Trinidadian communities. The Prime Minister and 
his Ministers visited several communities, in the PNM heartland of 
Laventille and Sea Lots36, in the hope to minimize any fears that the 
Afro-Trinidadian community may have of an « Indo-Trinidadian 
government ». But whereas some of these concerns and even fears 
could be explained in terms of the plural society and the need to 
assuage the fears of ethnic domination37, the Panday administration 
created various crises of its own, which saw the diversion of attention 
and energies away from calling the local government election as 
« soon as was practically possible ». In this regard, a major debate in 
relation to the role of the media developed. The government went on 
the offensive, calling for a private newspaper to dismiss its editor, after 
the newspaper carried certain stories and pictures which seemingly 
misrepresented the Prime Minister. While the Prime Minister may not 
have obtained the dismissal of the editor, the debate which raged, and 
which was fueled by other internal disagreements and developments in 
the media industry saw the diversion of attention from everything else, 
including the local government poll. Effectively, this allowed the 
UNC-NAR two additional months before focussing attention on a local 
government poll. Accordingly, with the five months passing between 
the time the government went to Parliament to get an extension for the 
calling of the election, the Prime Minister announced, in may, that the 
local government poll would be contested on 24 june 1996, a mere 
three days before the expiration of the extension granted by the 
Parliament. 
 
                                                          
36. See R. Lord, « Panday : I’m no Caroni PM », in Trinidad Guardian, March 28, 
1996, p. 1. 
37. See R. R. Premdas, « The Anatomy of Ethnic Conflict : Domination Versus 
Reconciliation », in Ralph Premdas ed., The Enigma of Ethnicity, Trinidad, School of 
Continuing Studies, 1993. 
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RACE AND TIDE CAMPAIGN IN TIIE 1996 LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT ELECTION  
Although the legislative requirements dictated that the local 
government poll was to be conducted before 27 june 1996, all the 
parties, including the ruling coalition, which had the power of 
determining the date of the poll, were not prepared when the date was 
finally announced. This was clearly demonstrated by the rush of all 
parties to find candidates and to draw up their official manifestos for 
the poll. With reference to the manifestos, all three parties sought to 
lay a framework based on a local government orientation. In this 
regard, all three parties adopted a near similar philosophical approach 
to local government. They all spoke of the need to foster community 
participation in local government. Thus, for instance, the UNC titled its 
manifesto « Empowering the People ». Based on the title, the 
manifesto sought to outline the need for a « partnership with the 
people » to be developed with local government authorities. The 
UNC’s partner in the coalition, the NAR, also called for greater 
participatory democracy. In its manifesto entitled « Empower your 
Community : Building from the Ground Up », the NAR complained 
about the emasculation of local government, and thus posited the 
urgent need to resuscitate local government. In line with such a 
position, the PNM, too, proposed to build communities through 
community participation. 
Beyond the philosophical underpinnings of local government, 
the manifestos explored the future and functioning of local 
governments. There was the call for further decentralization in terms of 
devolving additional powers and functions to local government. In this 
regard, the PNM and UNC manifestos focussed on management and 
staffing considerations, with both proposing to ensure adequate staff 
and resources to ensure that the local government councils deliver the 
services for which they were responsible. 
Having outlined very broad perspectives, the manifestos were 
silent on the specifics of making all of this happen. Consequently, it 
was anticipated that on the campaign trail, some of those specific 
details would be outlined. However, this was not to happen. The only 
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major local government issue which was discussed on the campaign 
was the move by the government to proclaim the Municipal 
Corporations Act a week before polling day. The UNC boasted that it 
had succeeded in proclaiming the Act in its entirety following only 
eight months in office, while the PNM had failed to do so during the 
previous four years. The PNM countered by suggesting that, even 
though the UNC did proclaim the Act, the mechanisms to enforce the 
sections now proclaimed were not in place and thus any such 
proclamations would be rendered useless. But apart from this subject, 
no other local government issue received any substantive treatment on 
the campaign trail beyond what was stated in the manifestos. On the 
hustings, national issues predominated. 
With the local government election having been called in the 
shadow of the parliamentary election, as well as in light of the various 
national debates and concerns, it was inevitable that the campaign was 
to locus on such national issues rather than local ones. Consequently, 
when the parties had finalized their slate of candidates and thus began, 
in earnest, the campaign, the issues were national rather than local. The 
Opposition PNM called its manifesto « Enough is Enough », and 
considered the june 1996 polls a referendum on the UNC-NAR 
coalition government38. The UNC, which fought the election in an 
accommodation with its coalition partner in central government, 
accepted the PNM’s challenge that the election should be viewed as a 
referendum on the government’s eight month reign. Thus, in winding 
down his campaign, Prime Minister Panday asked his supporters for 
their vote as a sign of saying « Yes, you’re going right »39. The third 
party in the race, the NAR, while seemingly trying to explicitly steer 
away from national issues, ended up in doing just that. The NAR 
focused its attention on the issue of national unity, and thus 
campaigned on the basis that it was the only organization which could 
bridge the gap between the two ethnic groups. At the same time, the 
NAR’s campaign took on a more partisan perspective, whereby party 
 
                                                          
38. See « Enough is Enough’ Manning : june 24 polls referendum on Govt », in 
Sunday Guardian, June 2, 1996, p. 1.  
39. See « Panday asks voters for the sign », in Sunday Express, June 23, 1996, p. 3. 
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leaders suggested that the party’s success in the local government 
elections, would serve to empower the NAR within the coalition 
government40. The campaign, therefore, at least from the perspective of 
what was to be presented on the platforms of the three political parties, 
focussed on national rather than local government issues. 
On the hustings, with the election being viewed as a 
referendums, the UNC and NAR concentrated on defending the 
policies adopted within the preceding seven months. The UNC, 
claiming that « we’ve only just begun », identified various policies 
related to reducing prices of food and other consumer goods, the fight 
against crime, as well as a review of energy sector policies which were 
to result in increased earnings from that sector. In full page newspaper 
advertisements, the UNC reminded the population of the previous 
Manning’s administration record, suggesting PNM’s mismanagement 
of the economy, resulting in widespread poverty. Fingers were also 
pointed at the PNM in the disposal of state enterprises, in a manner not 
beneficial to the state. 
In turn, the PNM campaign, with regard to the national issues, 
focussed on the failure of the government to bring about a substantial 
reduction in the high crime rate and in the cost of living, arguing that 
the UNC had failed on both these counts. The PNM platform speakers 
questioned the government’s policy on national unity. Instead of 
national unity, the PNM alleged that the government was promoting 
disunity, and this was manifested in terms of victimization, unfair 
dismissals, as well as the forgiving of a debt to Guyana41. Most of 
theses issues, reflected the centralization of the racial factor in 
Trinidad’s politics. While all the parties in the campaign claimed not to 
have resorted to the race card, they all raised the issue of race in the 
various campaign speeches. The PNM implicitly warned its supporters 
 
                                                          
40. See Peter Richards, « ANR : Win will help NAR to reorganize », in Trinidad 
Guardian, June 10, 1996, p. 1. 
41. The issue of debt forgiveness to Guyana, was viewed in a racial context, 
whereupon it was an « Indo-Trinidadian » government helping an « Indo-Guyanese 
government ». See Suzanne Mills, « PNM jury’ delivers guilty verdict on coalition 
Govt », in Newsday (Trinidad), June 16, 1996, p. 2.  
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of racial discrimination by the UNC-NAR government. At the 
launching of the campaign, PNM leader, Patrick Manning, spoke of 
discrimination, making specific reference to employment of Afro-
Trinidadians. Without explicitly referring to race, Manning complained 
about « discrimination and division ». He argued that under his 
administration, four administrative regions along the east-west 
corridor, which coincidentally were predominantly populated by Afro-
Trinidadians, had comparatively higher levels of poverty than County 
Caroni, a predominantly Indo-Trinidadian region. Accordingly, in 
1995, his administration created over 200 unemployment relief 
projects (URP) in the East-West corridor, while 16 such projects were 
implemented in County Caroni. Manning complained that in 1996, the 
UNC-NAR government had decreased the number of projects in the 
east-west corridor to 129, while it increased County Caroni’s tally to 
3642. This was presented as an indicator of government’s 
« discriminatory practice » against PNM strongholds. 
Following his initial salvo, Manning persisted with the concerns 
of discrimination, and in making reference to the firing of Chief 
Executive Officers of various state enterprises, ensured that such 
dismissals were an election issue. In this regard, Manning was later to 
say, on a public platform, that the UNC-NAR government, « under the 
disguise of national unity they are imposing on this population some of 
the most racist acts ever perpetrated by any government of Trinidad 
and Tobago »43. The PNM thus brought the issue of race home to the 
election. 
While the PNM attacked the governing coalition for racial 
discrimination, both coalition partners argued that their parties were 
rather seeking to promote national unity. In this regard, the NAR 
party chairman told a public meeting that the « future of national unity 
 
                                                          
42. Sandra Chouthi, « Manning sees Govt Caroni bias », in Sunday Express 
(Trinidad), June 2, 1996, p. 1. 
43. Stephen Boodram, « Manning : Racist acts under national unity », in Trinidad 
Guardian, June 10, 1996, p. 1. 44. See « NAR : Victory will make us equal », in 
Trinidad Guardian, June 19, 1996, p. 545. Debra Wanser, « The PNM is now like the 
DLP », in Sunday Guardian (Trinidad), June 23, 1996, p. 17. 
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in this country lies with the NAR in conjunction with the UNC »44. 
Accordingly, when national unity is viewed as racial harmony, the 
NAR’s position was simply that the PNM was unable to bridge the gap 
amongst the various ethnic groups of the society. 
The UNC, in adopting a somewhat similar position, sought to 
chastise the PNM for focussing on race, and in appealing « to only one 
race ». UNC leader Panday thus likened the PNM to the Democratic 
Labour Party (DLP), which was the Indo-Trinidadian party of the 
1960s. The DLP had failed to win an election because it appealed only 
to Indo-Trinidadians. Consequently, Panday advised that « no party 
can become the Government unless it can appeal to both Indians and 
Africans »45. On this basis the UNC defended its position and policies, 
claiming that the PNM’s claim of racist acts were simply last ditch 
efforts to win support. Panday further claimed that all the issues raised 
on the PNM platform had racial overtones. He declared that the PNM’s 
attacks on Caroni, as well as the PNM’s campaign against the 
dismissals of certain CEOs were placed in a racial context. He even 
cited the debt forgiveness to Guyana, which arose out of a Paris Club 
formula, as having racial overtones. With regard to the debt 
forgiveness to Guyana, the Panday administration had argued that it 
was well accepted by the majority that it was impossible to recover all 
the Guyanese debt. His government was therefore moving to recover 
some of the debt, but, he added, the mere forgiveness was being 
postulated as a race-based decision, where the Trinidad « Indian 
government » was freeing a Guyanese « Indian government » of its 
debts. From this perspective, Panday claimed that his government was 
firm in its quest for national unity and would not divide the country on 
racial or any other grounds46. 
 
                                                          
44. See « NAR : Victory will make us equal », in Trinidad Guardian, June 19, 
1996, p. 5. 
45. Debra Wanser, « The PNM is now like the DLP », in Sunday Guardian 
(Trinidad), June 23, 1996, p. 17. 
46. Yvonne Webb, « Panday : we will not divide country on racial grounds », in 
Trinidad Guardian, June 6, 1996, p. 3. 
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Having stage-managed their campaigns, so much so as to ensure 
that the apathetic in the society would be compelled to make their vote 
count, polling day was approached with great anticipation by all 
parties. The PNM hoped that the election result would show it was 
regaining ground lost in the Parliamentary election of November 1995. 
There was concern that the PNM had lost ground in the 1995 elections 
because it had failed to inspire some Afro-Trinidadians to vote for the 
party47. For the PNM therefore, the 1996 election presented the 
opportunity to regain ground, by consolidating the Afro-Trinidadian 
vote for the PNM. The UNC, on the other hand, saw the poll as a 
mirror to reflect public opinion of its short tenure in office, and thus 
hoped for a vote of confidence. Again in terms of race, the UNC was 
hoping that such a vote of confidence could only be possible with 
support from both Afro and Indo-Trinidadians. The NAR conceived 
the election merely as rule of measure to legitimize the NAR’s place in 
Trinidad’s politics, inclusive of all the races, and not be confined to 
Tobago. In this context the results of the elections are now to be 
assessed. 
THE RESULT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS  
ON PARTY POLITICS IN TRINIDAD  
Although the platform campaigning by the three political parties 
was predominantly focussed on issues other than local government 
ones, the fact remains that the contest was for the control of fourteen 
municipal corporations which comprised, in total, 124 electoral 
districts. Of the 260 candidates who contested the election, 10 were 
identified as independent candidates48, while the other 250 contested 
 
                                                          
47. See Selwyn Ryan, « Round of applause for calypso », in Sunday Express, 
February 25, 1996, p. 9. 
48. It may be noted here that the 10 independent candidates were originally 
screened and some were even selected as candidates for the UNC, prior to the 
announcement of the accommodation with the NAR. On the announcement that certain 
seats were allocated for the NAR to contest, the disgruntled aspiring UNC nominees 
proceeded to have themselves nominated as independent candidates. 
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the poll on a party card, with 124 candidates standing for the PNM 
while another 126 representing the UNC-NAR accommodation49. 
Notwithstanding the entry of the NAR in the elections, it was 
clear that its participation was to be limited, since it did not possess an 
electoral base in Trinidad, unlike the other parties, the PNM and UNC. 
More importantly, the bases of these latter parties were grounded in 
racial blocs. Such a perspective is further supported through an 
analysis of the historical evidence and how constituencies voted, and 
culminating in the electoral tie that emanated in the 1995 parliamentary 
election. In such a context therefore, the NAR chances of success in 
1996 were remote because, based on its accommodation with the UNC, 
the seats allocated for the NAR to contest were strongholds of the 
PNM. Moreover, even in those instances where the PNM was not 
insurmountable, the NAR faced the challenge of « independent » 
candidates, who sought to divide the anti-PNM vote sufficiently for the 
PNM to retain the seats. A case in point was the Calvary district in the 
Arima Borough, where the PNM candidate, Melan Garcia, secured 
only 484 votes while the « independent », Martin Hollingsworth, 
received 417, with 252 votes going to Peter Asse, the NAR candidate. 
Effectively, the NAR was later to complain that the UNC undermined 
their candidates’ chances of victory by giving « critical » support to the 
« independents » who were really the UNC’s candidates for the 
election, but who had not contested on a UNC ticket because of the 
accommodation. Notwithstanding such evidence, the fact remains that 
the NAR, as well as all the independent candidates failed to win any of 
the 124 available seats. 
Without any success for the NAR or the independents, the seats 
in the 1996 local government election were shared by the PNM and the 
UNC. The PNM won 63 of the 124 seats with the UNC taking the 
 
                                                          
49. In the week preceding nomination day, an accommodation was reached 
between the UNC and the NAR, whereupon it was decided that the UNC was to 
contest 90 seats with the other 34 being contested by NAR candidates. However, at 
nomination day, two persons who were screened and proposed by their respective 
parties before the accommodation was finalized, proceeded to file nomination papers 
on behalf of their respective parties. Effectively with these two additional candidates, 
the 250 persons represented contested the election on a party card. 
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other 61. But, whereas in terms of numbers, the PNM won more than 
half of the available seats, a more detailed analysis of the results, 
especially in terms of comparative analysis between the 1992 and 1996 
polls, show the PNM as having lost substantive ground, in the realm of 
local government, while at the same time the UNC seemed to be in the 
ascendancy. 
Although the PNM won the majority of seats in 1996, that 
majority was significantly reduced from what the party had obtained in 
1992. Put differently with the PNM having won 63 of the 124 seats in 
1996, its proportion of seats in the local government arena was reduced 
from 62 percent, in 1992, to 51 percent in 1996. This 11 percent 
decline in the PNM’s proportion was transferred to the UNC, which 
saw its proportion of seats rise from 38 percent to 49 percent over two 
elections. A similar scenario occurred in relation to the votes cast. In 
the 24 june 1996 local government poll, the UNC obtained 178 800 
votes as compared with the PNM’s tally of 154 307. The UNC 
obtained 24 000 more votes that the PNM in 1996. Since 1956, when 
the PNM entered party politics in Trinidad, this was the first time that 
the PNM, as a party, received less votes than any other party in a local 
government poll. Furthermore, and from the comparative perspective 
of the 1992 and 1996 local government polls, despite an increase in the 
electorate of over 24 000, the PNM’s 1996 tally of votes was slightly 
lower (511) than what the party had received in the 1992 local 
government poll. A near opposite picture emerges for the UNC, which 
saw an increase of over 65 000 votes from what that party polled in 
1992. 
Apart from actual votes, the UNC, in 1996, has been able to 
advance its challenge in breaking the PNM’s hegemony on local 
government. From the perspective of control of the municipal 
corporations ; this result ensured that the PNM obtained the majority of 
seats in seven of the fourteen councils, with the UNC having a 
majority in another six. One council, the Siparia Regional Corporation, 
which had eight electoral districts, was split four seats each for the 
PNM and the UNC. This tie, was later broken by the « drawing of 
lots » and resulted in the UNC gaining control of the council. 
Consequently, control of the fourteen corporations are now equally 
shared by the UNC and the PNM. 
. . 
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The equal sharing, in 1996, of the fourteen municipal 
corporations between the PNM and the UNC serves to underscore the 
electoral tie which resulted in the 1995 Parliamentary election. But 
more importantly, the electoral map which demonstrates political party 
distribution of parliamentary seats is, with minor adjustments, near 
replicated by the map showing party controls of the various local 
government councils. Put differently, the results of the 1996 local 
government poll clearly emphasizes the political configuration and 
division of Trinidad, between the UNC and the PNM. Moreover, when 
such a party-based configuration is contrasted with the racial 
demography, it becomes easily visible that the politics and voting 
behavior of citizens in Trinidad is closely linked with race. Effectively 
therefore, the result of the 1996 local government poll serves to 
emphasize that racial voting divides Trinidad today, and moreover, that 
party consolidation is closely tied to race-based politics, the concern is 
whether a local government can really facilitate local participation in 
government or if, in the Trinidad context, all a local government poll 
serves to do is to consolidate race-based parties. 
CONCLUSION  
The 1996 local government poll clearly emphasized the race-
based political party structure in Trinidad as was indicated earlier in 
the 1995 Parliamentary elections. However, in positing that race is a 
critical consideration in determining party consolidation and support 
and, by extension, who governs, the more important question which 
faces the society is that in acknowledging the near, equality between 
Afro- and Indo-Trinidadians, is the polity condemned to political 
stalemate ? Moreover, in such a context, what scope is there for 
political stability ? While this paper does not propose to offer 
substantive answers to such questions, certain lessons can be gleaned 
from the present political scenario. 
With the near equality of the two dominant races in Trinidad, 
and with the two major race-based parties drawing their support from 
their respective racial bloc, both parties must seek to promote the 
interest of all the differing groups and blocs of the society if they are to 
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enhance their chances of electoral success. Put differently, the PNM 
seems to have been on the decline, if only because there seemingly is 
the alienation of Indo-Trinidadians from the party. The emphasis, by 
the PNM leadership, on perceived racial-discrimination of the Afro-
Trinidadian community by an Indo-Trinidadian government, as well as 
the sustained attacks on the supposedly well being of County Caroni, 
the heartland of the Indo-Trinidadian community, served to push Indo-
Trinidadians into the belief that the PNM did not care about them. 
Indo-Trinidadians thus grabbed at the opportunity to galvanize 
themselves around the UNC, the « Indian Party » which would have to 
protect their interest. Such a perspective was further compounded by 
comments from politicians and political analysts that there was an 
urgent need to restrict the ascendancy of the Indo-Trinidadians, who 
had achieved government. In this regard, on the night of the elections, 
one commentator clearly stated that the Afro-Trinidadian community 
must band together, if only to put a halt to the continued rise of the 
Indo-Trinidadians50. Such statements have only served to further 
concretize and consolidate the Indo-Trinidadian community into one 
bloc, since what was seemingly being portrayed was that political 
power did not rightfully belong to the Indo-Trinidadians. In such a 
scenario, Indo-Trinidadians have been forced onto the defensive and 
thus it is highly likely that they will continue to vote race, until such a 
time that they are fully accepted as equals and not as minorities or 
second class citizens. 
Of course, at the same time, the UNC, as well as the PNM must 
strive to become mass-based parties. To this end, both parties must 
seek to win the support of the citizens of mixed ancestry, as well as 
those of European, Chinese and Syrian-Lebanese descent. Since these 
communities comprise 15 percent of the electorate, they could 
seemingly serve as a good tie-breaker in an election based on party 
politics with a racial configuration. 
 
                                                          
50. Lloyd Best, an Afro-Trinidadian commentator stated on national television that 
the pendulum which had swung too far, and as such all Airo-Trinidadian political 
parties must combine forces to ensure that there is a check on the rise of Indo-
Trinidadians to political power. 
. 
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Résumé 
 
Bien que les manifestes des 
trois partis politiques en lice lors des 
élections du gouvernement local de 
Trinidad en 1996, aient suggéré que 
les élections concernaient surtout des 
questions locales gouvernementales, il 
n’en demeure pas moins vrai que les 
problèmes d’ethnicité, de race et de 
communalisme ont réellement boule-
versé la campagne, dans la course aux 
élections. Nonobstant le fait que les 
manifestes étaient centrés sur l’absen-
ce presque totale de décentralisation 
du pouvoir et de l’autorité aux 
organismes gouvernementaux locaux, 
les préoccupations d’autonomie locale 
et le manque d’efficacité du système 
gouvernemental local, la véritable 
campagne semble avoir voué ces 
considérations à un rang auxiliaire 
dans le contexte électoral. Bien sûr, 
un tel scénario s’explique par le fait 
que les élections de 1996 du 
Gouvernement local se sont déroulées 
dans l’ombre des élections parlemen-
taires de 1996 et ont, de ce fait, re-
dynamisé les partis politiques autant 
que ranimé les divisions raciales et 
même les tensions de la société 
trinidadienne. Les élections ont 
effectivement contribué à restructurer 
et à consolider les blocs raciaux et 
politiques existants sur la scène 
trinidadienne. 
 
 
 Abstract 
 
Whereas the manifestos of the 
three political parties which contested 
the 1996 local government elections, 
in Trinidad, suggested that the 
elections were really about local 
government issues, the fact remains 
that issues of ethnicity, race and 
communalism served to overwhelm 
the actual campaigning in the run up 
to the elections. Notwithstanding that 
the manifestos focussed on the near 
lack of devolution of power and 
authority to the local government 
corporations, the concerns of local 
autonomy, and the lack of effective-
ness of local government system, the 
actual campaign seemed to have 
destined these considerations to being 
ancillary issues within the context of 
the elections. Of course such a 
scenario is explained by the fact that 
the 1996 local government election 
came in the shadow of the 1996 
Parliamentary elections, and as such 
had the effect of re-energizing party 
politics as well as racial divisions and 
even tensions in the Trinidad society. 
Effectively, the elections served to 
streamline and consolidate the 
political and racial blocs which exist 
in the Trinidad setting. 
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